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Introduction
The Bank of England has a longstanding interest in the
structure of the financial system.  System structure can affect
financial stability through influencing the cost and availability
of the financial services on which households and businesses
depend.
The basic services provided by the financial system are
relatively timeless, but the structure of the system that
provides them continues to evolve.  While new products and
players have emerged over the past 50 years, UK banks have
become ever larger and more central to the provision of the
full range of financial services.
Post-crisis, public-policy attention has been focused on the
potential costs of this evolution.  In particular, the emergence
of large, highly interconnected universal banks has
transformed the financial network, increasing the likelihood of
system-wide contagion in the event of an individual bank’s
distress.  To the extent that these banks are ‘too important to
fail’, private incentives are distorted and resources
misallocated (Haldane (2010)).  Acknowledging this, efforts are
under way both domestically and internationally to address
the risks associated with too important to fail institutions.
This article examines the structure of today’s banking system
and explores the drivers of change over recent decades.  It
begins with an overview of the services provided by the
financial system and describes how the provision of these has
changed over time.  It goes on to identify key economic and
regulatory drivers for change, before taking stock of the policy
challenges ahead.
The role of the financial sector
The financial system provides a range of services that support
the real economy.  It is convenient to distinguish three main
types of financial service:
￿ Payment, settlement and transaction services.  These
services include the provision of deposit and custody
accounts, as well as services to support the efficient
settlement of payments between households and
companies.
￿ Intermediation.  Household savings are typically pooled in
deposit accounts, pension funds or mutual funds.  They are
then transformed into funding for households, companies or
government.
The financial system provides three key services:  payment services, intermediation between savers
and borrowers, and insurance against risk.  These services support the allocation of capital, and the
production and exchange of goods and services, all of which are essential to a well-functioning
economy.  While the basic financial services are relatively timeless, the characteristics of the
system providing them change continuously, in response to both economic and regulatory
developments.  This article tracks the evolution of a core component of the financial system in the
United Kingdom, the banking sector, describing how technology has transformed the economics of
banking, and how deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s freed banks to take advantage of new
opportunities through globalisation and financial innovation.  The result has been the emergence of
large, functionally and geographically diverse banking groups.  Post-crisis, public-policy attention
has been focused on the costs of a banking sector dominated by large and complex institutions that
are seen as too important to fail.
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￿ Risk transfer and insurance.  Deposit accounts allow
households and companies to insure themselves against
liquidity shocks, while securitisation, derivatives and other
insurance contracts facilitate the dispersion of other
financial risks within the economy.  For example, foreign
exchange derivatives allow companies to protect their
international revenues from fluctuations in foreign exchange
rates;  and securitisation markets package and disperse
banks’ loan exposures.
Evolution of the role of banks in the financial
system
At the end of the 1950s, around 100 banks provided
information to the Radcliffe Committee, which had been
established to review the workings of the UK monetary
system.  Of these, the 16 London and Scottish clearing banks
held around £8.3 billion in assets, amounting to 85% of total
UK banking assets and more than 30% of UK GDP (Chart 1).(1)
The clearing banks were relatively narrowly focused on the
provision of payment services, deposit-taking activities and
short-term corporate lending.  They were almost entirely
funded by customer deposits, 60% of which were held in
current accounts (which paid no interest and were accessible
on demand).  A further 35% of deposits were held in
interest-bearing time deposit accounts.
These deposits generally funded low-risk and liquid assets.
Indeed, in 1960, 35% of London clearing banks’ assets were
held in cash, Treasury bills and discounted bills, with a further
28% of assets held in gilt-edged securities.(2) Customer loans
constituted just 30% of the London clearing banks’ assets.
Other financial institutions were important lenders to
households.  That included the building society sector, which in
1960 held £2.6 billion of predominantly mortgage assets
(around a third of the value of clearing bank assets).  Hire
purchase and finance companies — not included in Chart 1 —
also engaged in consumer lending.
Banks’ and building societies’ sterling assets grew steadily over
the next two decades, together increasing from around 50% of
GDP to 65% between 1962 and 1979 (Chart 2).  One of the
most striking trends in this period was the emergence of
London as a truly international financial centre.  During the
1960s and 1970s, foreign-owned banks began to expand their
presence in the United Kingdom (Davies (2002)).  This
contributed to a sharp increase in holdings of foreign currency
assets by both domestically and foreign-owned banks
operating in the United Kingdom.  Indeed, by 1979, UK
monetary and financial institutions held £172 billion of foreign
currency assets — over half of their total assets.
Foreign-owned banks were predominantly engaged in
wholesale activity, in part reflecting the rise of the
























Source:  Committee on the Working of the Monetary System (1959).









UK assets denominated in foreign currency
Non-resident assets denominated in foreign currency
Percentages of GDP
1979 1962
Source:  Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (1980).
(a) Values for 1979 use building society assets in 1978.
(b) Some components of foreign currency assets in 1962 are unavailable.  In such instances, data
from the first available period are used.  This is likely to overstate the 1962 foreign currency
component.
(c) All building society assets are assumed to be sterling.
Chart 2 Monetary financial institutions’ sterling and
foreign currency assets(a)(b)
(1) Here, the term clearing bank refers to a bank that is a member of an organised
arrangement for clearing customer cheques and settling the resulting claims between
banks.  In London, formal daily cheque clearing arrangements were established around
1775.  From 1854, settlement between banks took place across accounts at the
Bank of England.  For a history of clearing and settlement arrangements, see
Manning et al (2009).
(2) The high level of government debt holdings in part reflected the build-up of debt
during World War II.
(3) The eurocurrency market, which initially developed in response to regulatory
constraints in the United States, is where financial transactions (eg loans, deposits) in
a given currency take place outside of the jurisdiction in which that currency is legal
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Today, more than 300 banks and building societies are licensed
to accept deposits in the United Kingdom.  However, the
provision of retail banking services is highly concentrated.  Of
the 16 clearing banks present in 1960, fifteen are now owned
by the four big UK banking groups:  RBS, Barclays, HSBC and
Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) (Figure 1).(1) These banks, along
with Nationwide and Santander, together account for almost
80% of the stock of UK customer lending and deposits.
Collectively, however, the four largest groups account for a
smaller share of the market for these services than the banks
from which they originated (Chart 3).
The building society sector, having continued to expand
during the 1980s and 1990s, saw a sharp contraction in the
mid-late 1990s, as many building societies demutualised
and became banks (Chart 4).  Over the past 50 years, the
number of societies declined from over 700 in 1960 to just
52 today.
As the clearing banks have grown and consolidated over







































































































































































































































Sources:  Bankers Magazine, Collins (1988), published accounts and RBS Archives.
(a) The figure shows bank mergers involving the 16 London and Scottish clearing banks present in 1960, together with their acquisitions of building societies and demutualised building societies.
(b) The balance sheets of institutions are included from the point of merging or acquisition.
(c) Clydesdale was owned by Midland Bank until 1987 when it was sold to National Australia Bank.









Percentages of total loans and deposits
RBS(d) Barclays HSBC LBG(e)
1960 2010 1960 2010 1960 2010 1960 2010
Sources:  Bankers Almanac (1961–62), Bankers Magazine (1960), Committee on the Working of
the Monetary System (1959) and interim and full-year published accounts.
(a) The shading in 1960 represents the component clearing banks that later consolidated into
the banks shown.  Clydesdale is excluded.
(b) Values used are total loans and deposits to customers in all currencies.
(c) The total value in 1960 refers to the loans and deposits of the London and Scottish clearing
banks, foreign-owned banks and building societies in 1958.  The 2010 total includes the loans
and deposits as stated in the 2010 interim published accounts of financial groups providing
more than 1% of the stock of loans and deposits to UK households and private non-financial
companies in 2009.
(d) The value of RBS in 1960 includes RBS, Williams-Deacon’s and Glyn Mills.
(e) Values for British Linen Bank are included in the 1960 consolidated accounts of Barclays, who
were, at this time, its majority owner.
Chart 3 Deposit-taking and lending services by the
clearing banks in their 1960 and 2010 forms(a)(b)(c)
(1) The only clearing bank among the 16 present in 1960 that is not now owned by one of
the four large UK banking groups is Clydesdale, which was acquired by the National
Australia Bank from Midland Bank in 1987.324 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
functions.  The largest banks have become truly ‘universal’
banks, their activities encompassing securities underwriting
and trading, fund management, derivatives trading and general
insurance.(1) This expansion coincided with a period of
significant growth in securities markets and the markets for
foreign exchange and derivatives (Chart 5).
The UK banks have established themselves as major global
players in these markets (Table A).  For instance, recent
market surveys place three UK banks among the top ten
worldwide in several markets, including bond underwriting,
foreign exchange trading and interest rate swaps.
The evolution to universal banking is reflected in an increase in
the contribution of non-interest income to banks’ earnings.
Today, non-interest income accounts for more than 60% of
banks’ earnings, having been a minor share three decades ago
(Chart 6).
Collectively, UK banks’ balance sheets are now more than
500% of annual UK GDP, with much of this growth having
occurred over the past decade (Chart 7).  Three of the four
largest banks individually have assets in excess of annual
UK GDP.  Relative to the size of the national economy, the
UK banking system is second only to Switzerland among
G20 economies, and is an order of magnitude larger than the
US system.(2) The expansion of the UK banking sector,
particularly since the late 1990s, far exceeds that in other
financial sectors (Chart 8).
(1) The ‘universal’ banking model was already an established feature of some other
banking systems.  For instance, in Germany, banks had an established role in
facilitating funding for long-term industrial investment projects (Gerschenkron
(1966)).  The UK universal banking model is somewhat different to that in Germany
however, since UK banks’ lending to corporates remains typically relatively short term.
(2) See Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010).
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  (right-hand scale)
Number
Sources:  Building Society Association and Bank calculations.
(a) The steep decline in building societies’ assets relative to GDP in the mid-1990s was mainly
driven by the conversion to bank status of a number of societies (following Abbey National’s
lead in 1989):  Halifax (in 1997), Alliance & Leicester (in 1997) and Northern Rock (in 1997)
(British Bankers’ Association (2002)).  This resulted in over half of building society assets,
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OTC single-currency interest
  rate swaps(a) (left-hand scale) 
Exchange-traded derivatives(a)
  (left-hand scale)
Euro bonds, total deal value (proceeds)
  (right-hand scale) 
Sources:  BIS Quarterly Review, Dealogic and ISDA Market Survey.
(a) Notional amounts outstanding.
Chart 5 Expansion of OTC interest rate swaps,
exchange-traded derivatives and euro bond markets
Table A Peer rankings of UK universal banks in selected market
segments in 2010
International Corporate Foreign Interest rate
bonds(a) bonds(a) exchange(a) swaps(b)
Barclays 1 4 3 1
HSBC 4 8 7 –
RBS 8 10 5 3
Sources:  Bloomberg, Euromoney Foreign Exchange Survey (2010) and Risk Corporate Survey (2010).
(a) Positions are based on market shares.
(b) The results on interest rate swaps — drawn from the Risk Corporate Survey — are based on the responses of
40 global large companies on their top three preferred dealers.






















Non-interest income (left-hand scale)
Net interest income (left-hand scale)
£ billions Ratio
Non-interest income/net interest income (right-hand scale)
Sources:  Bank of England and published accounts.
(a) The data are a backwardly consistent sample of institutions providing banking services in the
United Kingdom in 2009.  The sample includes the following financial groups:  Barclays,
Bradford & Bingley, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, National Australia Bank, Nationwide,
Northern Rock, RBS and Santander UK.  Where data are consistently available for the
UK component of the banking group, these have been used.Drivers of banking sector evolution
This section examines the factors that have influenced the
evolution of the banking sector.  It first examines the evidence
on economies of scale and scope, before exploring how the
economics of banking and the evolution of the market
structure might have been influenced by changes in demand
and regulation.  It closes with some thoughts on the potential
role of ‘too important to fail’ in the evolution of the banking
system.
Economies of scale and scope
One reason for the observed development of the banking
sector may be banks’ pursuit of economies of scale and scope.
These arise, respectively, when the unit cost of providing a
given banking service declines as the scale of provision of that
service increases, or when the unit cost of providing a mix of
services jointly is lower than the sum of providing each
separately.  The presence of such efficiency gains would be
consistent with both consolidation in the banking industry and
the expansion of banks’ roles beyond their traditional
functions.
The nature of these efficiency gains is likely to have changed
over time, driven by technological advances, financial
innovation and the globalisation of markets.  Furthermore,
banks’ ability to take advantage of such economies has also
evolved.  In the past, institutional and regulatory restrictions
on banks’ activities prevented banks from fully responding to
economic drivers.  Financial deregulation in the 1970s and
1980s removed these constraints.  At the same time,
deregulation also introduced stronger competitive forces in
the banking sector, encouraging banks to expand into new
markets offering higher (albeit more volatile) margins.
Recent banking industry studies have examined the potential
cost efficiencies inherent in the universal banking model.
These studies emphasise efficiencies arising from:  spreading
fixed costs over a larger volume of output;  and risk
diversification through capital pooling.(1) For large banks, it is
estimated that around 15%–20% of total costs are fixed.  Of
these, the largest components are technology costs and
corporate centre costs (eg head-office functions), for which
50%–60% and 80%–90%, respectively, are estimated to be
fixed (JPMorgan (2010)).
However, these industry studies rely primarily on case studies
and anecdotal evidence to support their claims.  The majority
of academic studies, on the other hand, do not find positive
evidence for economies of scale and scope beyond a relatively
small size.  For instance, Saunders (1996) surveys at least
20 empirical studies and finds little evidence of scale
economies for banks with assets greater than $5 billion.
Similarly, in a survey of more than 50 studies by Amel et al
(2004), the minimum efficient scale in retail commercial
banking appears to be somewhere below $10 billion in assets,
depending on the sample, country and time period.  Applying
these findings to the global population of banks in 2008 would
suggest that several hundred are above the threshold at which
no positive evidence for economies of scale could be found.
Beyond a certain size there may even be diseconomies of scale,
possibly due to the complexity of managing large institutions
(Haldane (2010)).  While some recent studies are more
supportive of the existence of scale economies in banking,
including a review of studies of mergers and acquisitions in
banking by DeYoung et al (2009), taken together the bulk of
the empirical literature to date has failed to identify material
economies of scale in commercial banking beyond a relatively
modest size.
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Banking sector assets (percentages of GDP)
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Sources:  Sheppard (1971), Bank of England, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and ONS.
(a) The definition of UK banking sector assets used in the series is broader after 1966, but using a
narrower definition throughout gives the same growth profile.
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Banking sector
Insurance and pension funds
Building societies
Investment and unit trusts
Percentages of GDP
65 75 85 95 05
Sources:  Sheppard (1971), Watson (2004), ONS and Bank calculations.
(1) The notion of risk diversification is consistent with anecdotal evidence in Frontier
Economics (2009) that large global banks are more likely to continue to lend during
an economic downturn.326 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
The evidence on scope economies is mixed and inconclusive.
Empirical research in this area is complicated by the low
incidence of specialist companies against which to compare
the outcomes of functionally diverse companies.  Stiroh and
Rumble (2006) fail to identify substantial economies of scope,
and in a study of financial conglomerates, Laeven and
Levine (2007) find evidence of a conglomerate discount,
rather than a premium (ie the market value of a
conglomerate is less than the sum of the market values of
the individual entities from which it is comprised).  However,
other studies, such as Hughes et al (2001) do find in favour
of scope economies.
Over time, technological advances have undoubtedly
transformed the economics of banking.  Automation in retail
banking and innovation in both risk management practices
and the design of financial products have all triggered changes
in the provision of the three core financial services.  But the net
effect of these changes on economies of scale and scope is
unclear.  On the one hand, the unit cost of processing power
continues to decline.  But at the same time, banks have
adopted new financial technologies and increased the breadth
and quality of their services, requiring increased expenditure
(Berger and Mester (2003)).  Smaller banks may also have
been unable to keep up with the pace of technological change
(Wheelock and Wilson (2010)).  One outcome of this is
increased market-wide reliance on a limited number of large
firms in the provision of technology-intensive services, such as
trade-execution and post-trade infrastructure provision.  For
example, as execution services in foreign exchange have
become more automated, the banks with the financial
capacity to make the largest up-front information technology
investment have gained market share (Barker (2007)).
Indeed, the ten largest institutions in foreign exchange (by
turnover) have a combined market share of around 77%, and
the 20 largest 93%.(1) And advances in information
technology and telecommunications would seem to have
accelerated the globalisation of finance towards the end of the
20th century.
Another factor operating on economies of scale and scope is
the value of specialist knowledge and private information.
Traditionally, knowledge transfer (either within or across
business lines) allows firms to respond quickly to new
opportunities, eg as new products and new markets emerge.
Economies of scope may also arise from access to private
information;  for example, deposit-taking activity may
generate information relevant for lending decisions.  However,
the importance of such private information may have declined
over time, particularly as judgement-based credit assessments
— especially in retail lending — have increasingly been
replaced with credit-scoring models.  Indeed, potential
information loss arising from increased use of models as a
bank grows in size, instead of basing decisions on judgements
and relationships, could itself generate diseconomies of scale.
Interaction with demand-side drivers
The functional expansion of UK banks may reflect the
changing demands of the corporate sector.  For instance,
UK private non-financial corporates increasingly rely on bond
and equity finance — currently comprising 65% of total
liabilities — rather than bank finance, and therefore seek
issuance, underwriting and market-making services.  They
also increasingly seek to hedge their financial risks via
derivatives markets.  Of the world’s 500 largest companies,
93% of non-financial businesses report using derivatives
(ISDA (2009)).
There is evidence that large companies value the provision of
investment banking services by their bankers.  For example,
bonds underwritten by commercial banks appear to
outperform those underwritten by investment banks, due to
the perceived ‘certification’ of the issue by a party with
privileged information on the borrower (Puri (1996),
Gande et al (1997) and Yasuda (2005)).
Multinational companies may also value being able to work
with one bank present in a range of countries.  Indeed,
according to Frontier Economics (2009), banks often enter
new markets purely on the basis of demand from their
multinational clients.  However, the Association of Corporate
Treasurers noted that, while some very large companies will
occasionally find it convenient to deal with one or two large
banks, corporate customers generally ‘do not need very large
banks’ (Association of Corporate Treasurers (2009)).
The interaction of regulatory and economic drivers
Regulation influences banks’ behaviour by shaping the
competitive environment and setting the parameters within
which banks are able to pursue their economic objectives.  This
subsection examines how these regulatory changes may have
interacted with economic drivers to catalyse the observed
changes in the market structure.
The Joint Stock Bank Act, 1826
Banking crises often result in new regulations.  In the
United Kingdom, a banking crisis in 1824–25 resulted in an
important legislative change.  Banks were no longer required
to be small private partnerships, sponsored by no more than
six partners, but rather could be incorporated as joint-stock
companies.(2) These new banks, able to raise capital from
shareholders, quickly took over older private partnership-based
lenders (Chart 9).
(1) See Broderick and Cox (2010), drawing on data from BIS (2010).
(2) There were 93 bank failures in England and Wales in 1825–26.  In response to this, the
Banking Co-partnership Act (May 1826) ended the Bank of England’s monopoly on
joint-stock status (from 1709 to 1825, the Bank’s charter had not permitted other
banks to form partnerships with more than six participants).  The Joint-Stock
Companies Banking Act 1857 permitted banks to register with unlimited liability,
which was extended to limited liability in 1858.Research and analysis Evolution of the UK banking system 327
The number of joint-stock banks declined equally quickly,
starting around 1875, as banks sought scale through
acquisition.  Over the same period, the volume of deposits
grew rapidly, with banks gaining broader national reach by
opening new branches.  This meant that by 1900 much more
banking was being done, but by far fewer institutions.(1)
Several key regulatory events in the second half of the
20th century were then instrumental in even more
fundamentally altering the structure of the UK financial
system.  These included, most notably, Competition and Credit
Control in 1971 and the Big Bang in 1986.
Competition and Credit Control, 1971
Competition and Credit Control was introduced by the Bank of
England in 1971, with the aim of promoting competition both
within the banking sector and between banks and the
non-bank financial sector.
At the time of the reforms, clearing banks were the main
providers of retail banking services in the United Kingdom, but
had begun to face increased competition from non-bank
intermediaries — notably, the so-called ‘fringe’ banks.(2)
Within the banking sector itself, price competition was limited
by (open) collusion in setting deposit rates and other customer
charges, leaving banks competing primarily on the basis of
reputation.
The 1971 reforms sought to end collusion on interest rates and
began the process of widening the scope of banks’ activities,
breaking down old barriers between different types of
intermediary.  Among the measures introduced, deposit banks
were allowed to participate freely in the wholesale market;
previously they had only been able to do this through their
finance house subsidiaries.  The reforms also extended the
scope of special deposits.(3) At the same time, liquidity
requirements were relaxed.  Before 1971, the clearing banks
had been required to hold liquid assets equivalent to 28% of
deposits.(4) From 1971, this was relaxed and extended,
requiring all banks to hold reserve assets equivalent to 12.5%
of eligible liabilities.
As such, the reforms improved the relative competitiveness of
clearing banks and were expected to trigger a gradual process
of reintermediation away from the fringe banking sector
(Cameron (1998)).  As Capie (2010) notes, however, fringe
banks continued to expand after the introduction of
Competition and Credit Control, in part reflecting economic
expansion during the 1971–73 period and a relaxation of
controls on property development.
This combination of regulatory and economic factors
coincided with one of the most rapid periods of credit growth
in the 20th century (Chart 10).  It also contributed to an
ongoing decline in banks’ liquidity holdings, ultimately to
below 5% of total assets by the end of the 1970s (Chart 11).
Other regulatory changes
From 1939, only authorised UK banks had been permitted to
deal in foreign exchange, keep accounts in foreign currency for
non-residents, and carry out certain exchange-control
functions.(5) In the light of changes in the international
monetary system over the course of the 1970s, these
(1) See Newton and Cottrell (1998).  This timing contrasts with the United States, where
consolidation did not begin in earnest until the 1980s.
(2) See Reid (1978).  Fringe banks — or secondary banks — were individually small lenders
who were not subject to Competition and Credit Control.  Their expansion in the early
1970s ultimately ended in the Secondary Banking Crisis of 1973–75.
(3) Special deposits, whereby clearing banks were required to hold a percentage of their
total deposits with the Bank of England, were first introduced in 1958 (implemented
in 1960).
(4) From 1951, the clearing banks held liquid assets equivalent to 28%–32% of total
deposits.  From 1963, this was formalised into a minimum liquidity requirement of
28%.
(5) Delegated to them by the Bank of England (Hadjiemmanuil (1996)).
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(a) Both series show real values constructed using the ONS GDP deflator.
(b) Sterling lending to UK PNFCs.
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Sources:  Collins (1988), Pressnell (1956) and Bank calculations.328 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
arrangements were deemed no longer appropriate, and in
1979 exchange controls were lifted.(1)
At the same time, the 1979 Banking Act was passed.  This Act,
the first to establish a regime of banking supervision, created a
two-tier system of banks and licensed deposit-takers.
Although this distinction created some barriers to entry, the
combined effect of these changes was increased competition
for UK banks from both foreign banks and non-bank
institutions.(2)
Judging the specific impact of the abolition of exchange
controls is complicated by the presence of other economic
factors (such as rising oil prices) and other economic policies
of the incoming government.(3) However, following the
removal of controls, the differential between domestic sterling
and euro sterling interest rates disappeared and international
capital flows accelerated.  With exchange controls also lifted in
several other countries, gross capital outflows as a percentage
of world GDP grew from an average of 2.8% during 1980–89,
to 4.5% during 1990–99, and further to 8.7% during
2000–09.(4)
This mirrored the globalisation of product markets, consistent
with demand drivers playing a part.  From the 1980s onwards,
UK banks became increasingly global.  Many established a
presence overseas (either organically or through acquisition)
and other cross-border business also expanded.  By the peak in
2008, UK financial institutions’ external assets were
approaching six times GDP (Chart 12).
The abolition of exchange controls made subsequent
financial liberalisation more likely, because businesses had
an option to relocate to less tightly regulated jurisdictions.
Such deregulation occurred over the course of the 1980s,
particularly in 1986.
The phrase ‘Big Bang’ refers to a series of reforms that sought
to eliminate perceived anticompetitive practices at the London
Stock Exchange and put London’s financial markets on an
equal competitive footing with its international rivals,
particularly the United States.(5) Among other things, the
reforms sought to remove price rigidities in the provision of
securities transactions and dismantle barriers to entry onto
the Stock Exchange.(6) Two practices received particular
attention:  fixed minimum commissions;  and so-called
‘single capacity’, which prevented both brokers from trading on
their own account and market makers (‘jobbers’) from acting
for customers.(7)
The abolition of minimum commissions changed the
economics of brokerage and market-making, making
joint-provision of these functions and foreign entry
inevitable.(8) Although the total number of institutions did
not increase, there was a marked rise in the number of
individual members of the Stock Exchange (Chart 13).  There
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Sources:  Bank of England, Bankers Magazine (1960–68) and Bank calculations.
(a) Data before 1967 cover only the London clearing banks.
(b) Cash + Bank of England balances + money at call + eligible bills + UK gilts.
(c) Bank of England balances + money at call + eligible bills.
(d) Cash + Bank of England balances + eligible bills.
Chart 11 Sterling liquid assets relative to total asset
holdings of the UK banking sector(a)
(1) The Bretton Woods era of fixed but adjustable exchange rates was dissolved between
1968 and 1973.
(2) See Matthews et al (2007).
(3) See Artis and Taylor (1989).  Indeed, one motivation for the lifting of exchange
controls had been to facilitate the investment abroad of North Sea oil surpluses.
(4) For example, the United States lifted some exchange controls in 1974, Japan in 1980,
Australia in 1983, and France and other European countries in 1986.
(5) Earlier, in 1979, the Stock Exchange rule book had been referred to the Restrictive
Practices Court by the Director-General of Fair Trading.
(6) See Plender (1986).
(7) See Gower (1988).
(8) See Piesse et al (1995).
(9) London merchant banks acquired stakes in eleven brokers and three jobbers in 1986,
and 65 foreign financial institutions acquired stakes in 90 brokers and fifteen jobbers.
See Michie (1999).














(a) Monetary financial institutions.  These comprise of entities resident in the United Kingdom
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Freed from regulatory restrictions, banks began to diversify
into new activities, using existing knowledge and infrastructure
to cross-sell new products (Melnick et al (2000)).  This attempt
to increase returns from existing assets ultimately led to the
emergence of universal banking.  Perhaps contributing to this,
the managed funds industry saw a marked expansion in the
years following these reforms, increasing competition for
household savings and reducing margins on retail banking
activities.
While the direction of travel in the 1980s was towards ending
functional restrictions in the banking sector, this period also
saw the beginnings of a shift towards internationally agreed
prudential regulation, notably through the introduction of the
Basel Accord in 1988.  This arguably also generated incentives
for banks to grow, by introducing an additional fixed cost of
meeting regulatory capital requirements and associated
reporting and supervision.
Too important to fail
So far, this section has argued that deregulation during the
latter part of the 20th century freed competitive forces in the
banking system and allowed banks to pursue efficiencies
through functional and geographical expansion.
But, as banks grew and broadened their scope
post-deregulation, they increasingly became ‘too important to
fail’.  This may have altered their private incentives in a
fundamental way.
A financial institution becomes too important to fail when the
potential losses to the financial system and wider economy
associated with its failure or distress would be so large or
uncertain that a government is unable to commit credibly not
to intervene in support.  These costs might include disruption
to critical banking functions, such as payment and transaction
services.
The potential economic costs associated with the default of a
large, complex, universal bank — particularly one that
combines the provision of payments services and trading
activities in a single entity — would most likely be sufficiently
high that government support would be forthcoming.  Such
support was, of course, observed during the recent financial
crisis.  As a result, the banking structure in numerous
jurisdictions now exhibits a greater incidence of full and partial
public ownership.
Once a bank is perceived to be too important to fail, a wedge is
driven between private and social returns to scale and scope,
since the bank does not internalise the potential economic
costs of its failure.  As such, too important to fail banks may be
subject to less market discipline, and are likely to grow more
rapidly and become more dependent on debt funding — and
hence more highly interconnected and leveraged.  Indeed, over
the period 1969 to 2009, retail deposits became a smaller
percentage of total liabilities, declining from 88% to less than
40%.  Particularly in the years prior to the financial crisis,
banks relied heavily on wholesale funding (Shin (2010)) and
their leverage ratios increased rapidly (Chart 14).
Reliance on wholesale funding, as well as functional expansion
into derivatives and securitisation markets, have led to the
formation of highly connected bank and non-bank
intermediaries.  This complex network of exposures can
propagate isolated shocks, such that distress at one node can
quickly spread through the system (Gai and Kapadia (2010)).(1)














Source:  Published accounts.
(a) Ratio of total assets to shareholders’ claims.
(b) See footnote (a) to Chart 6.
(1) Furthermore, more complex interconnectivity can reduce the transparency of the
financial network (Haldane (2009)), leading to panic in the financial system in the
event of a shock (Caballero and Simsek (2009)).













Source:  Piesse et al (1995), drawing on data from the London Stock Exchange.
(a) Individuals acting on behalf of member firms.
(b) Pre-1986, the total number of firms refers to the sum of the broker and jobber firms
(single-capacity trading required the market intermediaries to be separated according to
their function).  Following the abolition of the single-capacity trading requirement in 1986,
no distinction is made between the number of brokers and dealers.330 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
Institutions that are perceived to be ‘too important to fail’ may
also engage in excessive asset and maturity transformation.
As King (2010) remarked:  ‘greater risk begets greater size,
most probably greater importance to the functioning of the
economy, higher implicit public subsidies and hence yet larger
incentives to take risk...’.  Through this dynamic, too important
to fail is likely to have amplified the evolution towards
universal banking associated with underlying economic forces.
Conclusion
This article has illustrated the significant changes in the
structure of the UK financial system over recent decades.  It
argues that evolution reflects a number of factors, including
the natural economic drivers of economies of scale and scope,
interacting with demand-side drivers and financial
deregulation.
That expansion has given rise to a banking system with large
balance sheets, significant functional and geographical
diversity and complexity, a high level of leverage, and
extensive network interconnectivity.  The emergence of large
institutions that are deemed ‘too important to fail’ presents
important challenges for public policy.  Before the crisis,
commentators emphasised the efficiency gains associated
with these structural changes, in terms of the availability of
credit to households and businesses, the decline in lending
spreads, and the availability of a broad array of risk-insurance
services.  The IMF (2006), for example, observed that
globalisation and financial innovation had increased credit
availability to the economy.
Since the crisis, however, policymakers and governments have
begun to examine the social cost of pursuing such efficiencies
(Haldane (2010)).  And it is increasingly recognised that having
too important to fail institutions is a paradox that must be
tackled (Bank of England (2010)).
In response, an Independent Commission on Banking has been
established in the United Kingdom to consider the case for
structural reform in the banking sector.  And, internationally,
the Financial Stability Board is examining a broad range of
policy options to mitigate the financial stability risks posed by
systemically important financial institutions.(1)
(1) See Independent Commission on Banking (2010) and Financial Stability Board (2010).Research and analysis Evolution of the UK banking system 331
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